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attack, but disposed of plaintiff's charges on the basis that the
allegation was lacking in clarity and definiteness. It was said
that the mere fact that a person has pursued his remedy as a
bondholder in order to establish a standing as a judgment creditor
for the purpose of effecting a redemption is not presumptive evi-
dence of fraud.12  The decision may, however, be but a reflection
of a policy to encourage redemption so that a debtor's prop-
erty may go to satisfy as much of his liability as is possible.
4 It
would also appear that if a court is asked to determine rights be-
tween a redeeming judgment creditor and a purchaser at fore-
closure sale, it will, if at all possible, favor the former over the
latter.
IV. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Cases involving new developments in substantive criminal
law are, as usual, limited in number for the basic principles un-
dergo slight change during a survey period. Some expansion of
substantive criminal law has, however, resulted from the appli-
cation of basic principles to novel fact situations. It is, for ex-
ample, a well established principle that an individual has the
right to commit homicide in defense of his habitation,1 if neces-
sary, but that principle was, for the first time applied, in People
v. Eatnan,2 to the defense of a rented apartment. It was there
said that a tenant in possession had the right to use force, in-
cluding homicide if necessary, if the landlord should illegally at-
tempt to force an entrance into the premises in an effort to col-
lect rent. But an attempt, in People v. Snith,3 to expand the
definition of habitation to include a public mine office which ad-
joined the defendant's living quarters failed when the court there
declined to find that any defense of the habitation was involved.
92 Williams v. Williston, 315 Ill. 178, 146 N. E. 143 (1924).
93 Karnes v. Lloyd, 52 Ill. 113 (1869); Phillips v. Demoss, 14 Ill. 409 (1853).
94 Nudelman v. Carlson, 375 Ill. 577, 32 N. E. (2d) 142 (1941) ; Strauss v. Tuck-
horn, 200 Ill. 75, 65 N. E. 683 (1902) ; Whitehead v. Hall, 148 Ill. 253, 35 N. E. 871
(1893).
1 People v. Osborne, 278 Ill. 104, 115 N. E. 890 (1917) ; Foster v. Shepherd, 258
Ill. 164, 101 N. E. 411 (1913) ; Hayner v. People, 213 Ill. 142, 72 N. E. 792 (1905).
2405 Ill. 491, 91 N. E. (2d) 387 (1950).
3404 Ill. 125, 88N. E. (2d) 444 (1949).
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The use of force allegedly offered in self-defense came in for
scrutiny. In the case of People v. Smith,4 the defendant was fol-
lowed to his home and an attack was made upon him as he stood
on his front porch. It was held that his use of a metal crank
upon his assailant, who died from the blow, was an act of self-
defense and not the result of that sudden impulse of passion which
is necessary to constitute manslaughter. By contrast, in another
case also entitled People v. Smith,5 manslaughter, rather than self-
defense, was deemed established when it appeared that the de-
ceased assailant, shot in the back, was unarmed. The assailant
had threatened the defendant and had reached for something in
his back pocket but these acts were regarded insufficient to justify
a claim of self-defense when it appeared that the deceased had
retreated and had been pursued by defendant. In addition to
self-defense, the defendant in People v. Tanthorey6 claimed that
the shooting was accidental in character. The court pointed to
the intrinsic contradiction between these defenses and ruled that
the claim of accidental shooting negatived the possibility of self-
defense.
The last mentioned case also raised the question as to what
constitutes sufficient time between the provocation and the killing
to permit the voice of reason to be heard. There have been few
cases in Illinois in which the court has found that a sufficient
time existed. Leaving the area of danger and then returning with-
in a few minutes would seem to indicate a deliberate act with
sufficient time for cooling, if done by a reasonable man. Upon
the facts there presented, the deceased left the place of the al-
leged argument first and the defendant left a few minutes later,
both travelling in the same direction. After having proceeded
some three hundred feet, deceased and defendant met again and
it was at this spot that the deceased was killed. The court felt
that the time required to travel the distance was sufficient to
permit the cooling of the heat of anger, hence the defendant was
4404 Il. 350, 88 N. E. (2d) 834 (1949).
5404 Il. 125, 88 N. E. (2d) 444 (1949).
6 404 I1. 520, 89 N. E. (2d) 403 (1950).
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not entitled to have the homicide treated as being a voluntary
manslaughter.
The Illinois Criminal Code was amended, in 1921, and the
punishment for larceny was changed, so that every person con-
victed of larceny, "if the property stolen exceeds the value of
fifteen dollars, or if the property is stolen from the person of
another, "7 shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary for a term of
years. It had been pointed out, in People v. Sarosiek,8 by way
of dictum, that the effect of the amendment was to make the value
of the property, if stolen from the person of another, a matter
of no moment. Direct application of the amended statute, how-
ever, had not occurred until, in the recent case of People v.
McKay,9 the court was asked to rule on the sufficiency of an in-
dictment which failed to state the value of the property stolen
but did charge that it had been stolen from the person of the
victim. The earlier dictum was confirmed.
It cannot be said that the holding in People v. Barrett1 ° has,
in any way, clarified the law relating to embezzlement. A liquidat-
ing trustee was there charged with crime in that he was said to
have failed to deposit funds sufficient to cover checks issued for a
liquidation dividend, but instead used unclaimed sums from for-
mer dividends to cover up the deficit. Conviction was reversed
because the Supreme Court failed to find, among other things,
that the acts performed manifested the presence of the necessary
criminal intent to convert to defendant's own use. There might
be occasion to think that the failure to deposit, if true, would be
a sufficient basis to raise more than a mere inference of inten-
tion to perpetrate the crime.
One of the essential elements necessary for the establishment
of malicious mischief, under the Illinois statute, is that of proof
of ownership of the property damaged or destroyed. Bare allega-
tion that the property injured was a dwelling house in the lawful
7 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 389.
8375 Ill. 631, 32 N. E. (2d) 311 (1941).
9403 Ill. 417, 86 N. E. (2d) 218 (1949).
10405 Ill. 188, 90 N. E. (2d) 94 (1950), noted in 28 CHICAGo-KRNT LAw REVMw
271-2. Daily, J., wrote a dissenting opinion.
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possession and occupancy by the owner, without proof of such
allegation, was held insufficient, in People v. O'Brien," particu-
larly since there was no testimony concerning the nature or ex-
tent of the occupancy of the building or whether the possession
was lawful or exclusive. Proof of ownership rarely enters into
decisions involving malicious mischief, and the only case at all
similar to the one mentioned is an Ohio decision. 12  As the Ohio
statute there concerned required that the property be owned by
someone other than the defendant, it was there held that the in-
dictment was defective for failure to charge that the vehicle was
not the property of the defendant.
In People v. Potts,13 the defendant was charged with assault
with intent to commit rape by force, and also with assault with in-
tent to rape a female under the age of sixteen. He contended that
as the jury had failed to make a finding of guilt on the first
charge, leading to an implied acquittal thereon, he was thereby
automatically determined to be not guilty on the second. The
court agreed that the defense was novel, but found no merit in
it. While the case represents an initial attempt to use such a
contention in a case of assault with intent to rape, it has been
argued without avail in crimes of a different nature.1
4
On the procedural side, some points have been made. In
People v. Fry,5 an indictment charging that the defendant had
committed "indecent and lascivious acts" in the presence of two
named female children was challenged as being insufficient to fully
11404 Ill. 236, 88 N. E. (2d) 486 (1949). In People v. Barger, 338 Ill. App. 518,
88 N. E. (2d) 109 (1949), defendant first moved to quash an information charging
malicious mischief because of a failure to endorse the name of the "prosecutor"
thereon. The state urged that this was necessary only where the proceedings were
based on an indictment: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 717. The defendant
then appears to have changed his motion to quash into a plea in bar, and the same
was sustained. On writ of error by the state, the Appellate Court for the Fourth
District could find no case in point on the major issue but concluded that it was
forced to dismiss the writ of error, since no statutory right exists for the use
thereof at the instance of the state, although review is available from an adverse
ruling on a motion to quash: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 747.
12 State v. Meteff, 6 Ohio Supp. 312 (1938).
13403 I1. 398, 86 N. E. (2d) 345 (1949).
14 See. for example, People v. Mattei, 381 Ill. 21, 44 N. E. (2d) 576 (1942), and
People v. DeYoung, 378 Ill. 256, 38 N. E. (2d) 22 (1941).
15 403 Ill. 574, 87 N. E. (2d) 780 (1949).
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set forth a case of contributing to the delinquency of minors.'
The court refused to quash the indictment, believing the words
"indecent and lascivious" were sufficiently precise for they were
words of common usage and conveyed a definite meaning of lust-
fulness and sensuality. The court also refused to require the
setting forth of a more specific statement of the acts done, deem-
ing them to be so obscene as not to require that they should be
spread on the records of the court. But essential language was
said to be lacking, in People v. Scholl,1' where the information
charged that the defendant "unlawfully" neglected and refused
to provide for the support of her child but did not say that proper
care was "knowingly and wilfully omitted," although such knowl-
edge and wilfullness is an essential element of the offense.1s The
expression "unlawfully" was held not to be synonymous with
"knowingly" on the authority of a Texas case. 19
Stenographic errors arising in the preparation of indictments
can sometimes lead to startling results, but are often cured by
failure to raise objection at an appropriate time. In People v.
Cheney,20 for example, the victim's name was given as "Doris
Haggard," whereas it was actually "Doris Hoggard," but the
variance was not deemed to be substantial enough to require re-
versal of the conviction. 21 A seemingly more serious error was
involved in People v. Meyer 22 where the original typewritten
ninth count, which failed to charge a crime, had been crossed out
by ink lines, and a substituted ninth count then followed in proper
order. The verdict and judgment of guilty of murder was based
on this count alone. The defendant relied on the theory that no
valid indictment existed,23 but the court refused to agree in the
16 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, §§ 103-4.
17 339 Ill. App. 7, 88 N. E. (2d) 681 (1949). See also People v. Standerfer, 339
Ill. App. 454, 90 N. E. (2d) 229 (1950), which holds that an information charging a
failure to provide "proper and suitable" clothing is insufficient.
18 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 101.
19 Ham v. State, 118 Tex. Cr. Rep. 271, 40 S. W. (2d) 152 (1931).
20 405 Ill. 258, 90 N. E. (2d) 783 (1950).
21 The court relied on People v. Jankowski, 391 111. 298, 63 N. E. (2d) 362 (1945),
where a charge of assault on "Catherine Valenta" was held sustained by proof of
an assault on "Katherine Balenta."
22405 Il. 487, 91 N. E. (2d) 425 (1950).
23 See Ex parte Bain, 121 U. S. 1, 7 S. Ct. 781, 30 L. Ed. 849 (1887).
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absence of proof by the defendant that the deletion and substitu-
tion had occurred after the indictment had been returned by the
grand jury. It could cite no Illinois case for this view, but did
rely on a presumption against fraud and forgery. The omission
of words of art such as "kill and murder," in an indictment
charging murder, does not amount to a fatal defect, according
to People v. Williams,2' provided there is a clear charge of wound-
ing leading to the death of the victim.
2
5
Mental incompetence of the defendant at the time of trial,
especially when evident to the trial judge, should be reason to
refrain from proceeding with the trial. It had been held, in
People ex rel. Wiseman v. Nierstheimer,2 for example, that an
outstanding and uncancelled adjudication in another proceeding
to the effect that the defendant was mentally incompetent and
suffering from a permanent type of mental affliction was a matter
concerning which the trial court should take notice. An exception
to that doctrine was developed in People ex rel. Miller v. Robin-
som, 27 however, where an original petition for habeas corpus to
obtain relief from a criminal conviction was dismissed, because
the earlier proceeding had been one designed simply to permit
emergency confinement of the accused as a person in need there-
of for his own welfare 2 rather than one to procure an adjudica-
tion as to his sanity.29l There being no record of mental incom-
petence, it was said to be the duty of the defendant, or his counsel,
to project the issue into the case if trial was to be avoided on
that ground.
Questions concerning the right to a change of venue arose
when the lower court, in People v. Dieckman,30 refused to grant
to defendant permission to amend his petition based upon an
alleged prejudice on the part of the trial judge. The original
24405 Ill. 574, 92 N. E. (2d) 120 (1950).
25 The indictment was deemed aided by the doctrine of reasonable intendment
laid down in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 716.
26 401 Il. 260, 81 N. E. (2d) 900 (1948).
27 404 Ill. 297, 89 N. E. (2d) 32 (1949).
28 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 911 ., § 5-1.
29 Ibid., § 6-N1.
30o404 Ill. 161, 88 N. E. (2d) 433 (1949).
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petition for change was defective in that it was not accom-
panied by the necessary supporting affidavit of the defendant's
attorney, as then required by statute.3 1 It is well established
that, once a change of venue has been granted, the court has
the right to refuse to grant a second request based upon the
same allegation. 2 It was pointed out, in the instant case, how-
ever, that such doctrine does not preclude the defendant from
renewing his request after an amendment to his original peti-
tion, if the original petition has been denied. There is an ap-
parent difference between renewing a request which has been
denied, on the one hand, and repeating a request already once
granted, on the other. The right to obtain a change of venue
before trial on account of the prejudice of the trial judge does
not, however, carry over to a request for such a change on a
petition in the nature of a writ of error coram nobis filed after
conviction, according to the holding in People v. Sheppard.3 It
was there held that, because of the nature of the hearing es-
sential thereon, the defendant is not entitled to have the matter
transferred to another judge.
Two cases of interest treat with the right of a defendant to
be represented by counsel. An Illinois statute has long imposed
an affirmative duty on the trial court to furnish counsel for de-
fendants charged with capital offenses,34 but in only one case
prior to the present has a decision been reversed because of a
failure on the part of a court to observe that duty.3 5 A second
case, that of People v. Butler,36 has now been added. Reversal
was there ordered because the record failed to indicate that there
had been any explanation given to the defendant as to his right
to counsel or that any inquiry had been made to ascertain whether
he was able to employ counsel of his own choice. The opposite
31 The statute now requires that the accompanying affidavit may be made by
either the defendant or his attorney, instead of both: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2,
Ch. 146, § 21.
32 Ibid., § 26.
33 405 Ill. 79, 90 N. E. (2d) 78 (1950), noted in 28 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REvMw
374-5.
34 11. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 730.
35 People v. Williams, 399 Ill. 452, 78 N. E. (2d) 512 (1948).
36406 Ill. 189, 92 N. E. (2d) 752 (1950).
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of that situation may be seen in People v. McKay, 37 for there
the defendant's complaint was that the court had appointed a
public defender to represent him and had thereby, according to
him, deprived him of his constitutional right to seek his own coun-
sel. The novelty of the argument did not impress the higher
court, particularly since the defendant had made no objection to
the appointment nor had made any effort to secure his own coun-
sel. Indeed, the court felt that he had been extended assistance
beyond that required by law .
3
As is usually the case, several convictions were reversed dur-
ing the survey period because the evidence presented at the trial
was not sufficient in amount or not of such convincing quality as
to support a conviction. Thus, a finding that indecent liberties
had been taken with the person of a minor had to be reversed
and the cause remanded because the child's testimony was uncor-
roborated as well as for uncertainty as to other testimony at the
trial 9 In People v. Silva,40 a lower court's finding of guilt in
a rape case was reversed both because the testimony of the prose-
cutrix was not corroborated and because it was discredited by the
testimony of other persons present at the time of the alleged of-
fense. A third case, that of People v. McBeth, 41 also turned on
the question of sufficiency of the evidence to establish guilt on a
charge of receiving stolen goods. The novel fact situation in-
volved a female defendant, infatuated with a penitentiary parolee,
whom she allegedly thought was carrying on a legitimate "trad-
ing business" in her home but who was actually using the place
as a base for the handling of stolen property. The majority of
the court felt there was reasonable doubt over the point of de-
fendant's knowledge that the goods were stolen. Numerous cases
have dealt with the question of knowledge as an element in the
crime of receiving stolen goods, but the instant case is rare in
that it infrequently happens that a defendant is implicated solely
37 403 Ill. 417, 86 N. E. (2d) 218 (1949).
38 See also People v. Montiville, 393 Ill. 590, 66 N. E. (2d) 861 (1946), for a
former attempt to use the same novel argument.
39 People v. Watkins, 405 Ill. 454, 91 N. E. (2d) 406 (1950).
40405 Ill. 158, 89 N. E. (2d) 800 (1950).
41405 Ill. 608, 92 N. E. (2d) 77 (1950). Crampton and Simpson, 33, dissented.
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on the basis of having permitted another to place goods upon
his premises.
Comment by the prosecuting attorney on the defendant's
failure to testify served as the basis for reversal in People v.
Cheney,4 2 for such comment is not only violative of a state stat-
ute,413 but invades constitutional right as well. There may be oc-
casion to reflect on whether the right is an absolute one or not,
for the court took into consideration, when determining whether
the nature of the comment required reversal, such things as the
fact that the evidence did not eliminate all questions of doubt
and that the jury had given only a light sentence. The case
was distinguished from those in which the jury could not have
found any other verdict than one of guilty.
44
Establishment of the fact of imprisonment in the penitentiary
on a former occasion is a prerequisite to the imposition of the
aggravated punishment called for by the Illinois Habitual
Criminal Act.45 The recent case of People v. Byrnes46 raised the
question whether detention in a house of correction would meet
the requirement. The defendant had been confined in the Mil-
waukee House of Correction under a Wisconsin conviction prior
to the commission of an offense in Illinois and, on the basis
thereof, he had been given the greater sentence required by the
Illinois statute. The judgment was reversed and the cause re-
manded because the place of detention was not considered to be
the equivalent of the Illinois penitentiary, even though, under the
Wisconsin statute, the defendant might have received the greater
sentence, for the statute of that state is satisfied by imprisonment
in the state reformatory.47  The instant case parallels earlier
cases in which a former confinement in an Illinois reformatory has
been held to be insufficient.
48
42405 Ill. 258, 90 N. E. (2d) 783 (1950).
43111. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 734.
44 People v. Young, 316 Ill. 508, 147 N. E. 425 (1925).
45 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 602.
46405 Ill. 103, 90 N. E. (2d) 217 (1950).
47 State v. Clementi, 224 Wis. 145, 272 N. W. 29 (1937).
48People v. Perkins, 395 Ill. 553, 70 N. E. (2d) 622 (1947).
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In 1949, the legislature enacted a statute providing, in brief,
that any imprisoned person who asserts that there has been a
substantial denial of constitutional right, either state or federal,
may institute a post-conviction proceeding by petition in the
court of sentence setting forth the matters relied upon for relief.
49
The statute was held not to be open to constitutional criticism in
People v. Dale.'0 By reason of its existence, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit indicated that it would
refuse to consider the merits of the claim of violation of consti-
tutional right advanced in United States ex rel. Peters v. Ragen5'
until after an attempt had been made to obtain state relief in
accordance with the new Illinois procedure. The fact that the
relator's petition for a writ of habeas corpus had been denied by
the federal district court prior to the passage of the Illinois stat-
ute was said to be inadequate reason for relieving the relator from
the necessity of observing the requirement for exhaustion of
state remedies.
The federal district court, however, was none too pleased with
the type of justice that an Illinois court had dispensed in a
criminal case, as was indicated by the record in the case of
United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Ragen52 The relator there
charged that the Illinois officials who had handled the prosecution
for rape, of which he had been convicted, had intentionally with-
held information tending to establish that the victim had never
been raped from the examining physician. The relator had been
confined in the penitentiary for a number of years and had pur-
sued all state remedies without success before making application
to the federal court. It expressed the view that the relator had
"gone the merry go-round of Illinois justice and failed to get a
49 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 826 et seq. It may be ironic that the
situation reflected in the Marino case, one which would appear to have been the
primary cause for the passage of the statute, ultimately resulted in providing no
relief for the convicted defendant: People v. Marino, 404 I1. 35-7, 88 N. E. (2d)
7 and 8 (1949), following the action taken in Marino v. Ragen, 332 U. S. 561, 68
S. Ct. 240, 92 L. Ed. 170 (1947).
50406 Ill. 238, 92 N. E. (2d) 761 (1950).
51178 F. (2d) 377 (1949), cert. den. - U. S. -, 70 S. Ct. 425, 94 L. Ed. (adv.)
294 (1950). See also United States ex rel. Hamby v. Ragen, 178 F. (2d) 379
(1950), cert. den. 339 U. S. 905, 70 S. Ct. 515, 94 L. Ed. (adv.) 431 (1950).
5286 F. Supp. 382 (1949).
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hearing, or even a suggestion of a hearing on the serious charge
that he had made.' '3 Believing that due process of law, as
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, had been denied and
that the conviction and sentence was void, it ordered the prisoner
discharged. The court warned that to "condone the methods
evidenced in this case, is to invite grave injustice. There is one
way to stop a practice that has become altogether too common-
and that is to bring it to a conscious level where the public can
scrutinize it and take such steps as are necessary to insure a true
rendition of justice to all, regardless of race, color or creed." 5
The legal profession should be especially conscious of the validity
of these remarks.
V. FAMILY LAW
The usual large array of interesting cases was lacking, this
year, in the field of family law, but a few decisions are worthy
of attention. Among such is the case of LaRue v. LaRue,' for
it serves to reemphasize a distinction which should be remembered.
The decree for divorce there granted to the wife directed payment
to the plaintiff of a sum found due her on an unpaid loan between
the parties. The defendant did not pay as ordered, so the ex-wife
sought a rule to show cause why he should not be punished for
contempt. The ex-husband answered by admitting his failure
to pay but pleaded that, by reason of a prior adjudication in bank-
ruptcy in which proceedings he had listed the debt, the divorce
court lacked jurisdiction over the matter.2  The lower court
rejected the contention and found defendant to be in contempt.
On appeal, the Appellate Court for the Second District ruled the
contempt order improper.
It pointed out that certain money payments called for by
divorce decrees are not dischargeable in bankruptcy, but it dis-
tinguished between the payment here provided for and one calling
for the payment of alimony. Obligations of the latter kind are
53 86 F. Supp. 382 at 387.
54 86 F. Supp. 382 at 387.
1341 Ill. App. 411, 93 N. E. (2d) 823 (1950).
2 Jones v. Alton & S. R. Co., 5 F. Supp. 532 (1934).
